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Christian Attitudes to Marriage. From Ancient Times to the Third Millennium, by Peter 
Coleman, edited by Michael Langford. London: SCM, 2004. 269pp. pb. £18.99. ISBN 0-334-
02956-2. 
 
Current debates about marriage and sexuality usually proceed in a way that prevents them 
paying attention to the rich kaleidoscope of past human experience. Intimacy, sexuality, and 
issues about these, whilst governing large sectors of privatised modern Western societies, 
appear strange to earlier cultures. At the very least, those categories can provide only one part 
of a convincing account of human relationships. Also, by focusing discussion on private 
matters inalienable from human personality that make no significant impact on the interests of 
other people, they create an intrusive public discourse. John Stuart Mill termed such private 
matters ‘self-regarding’, and argued that they should not be subject to regulation by public 
bodies. Peter Coleman avoids these twin hazards by focusing on a tangible public institution 
with a clear genealogy, and thus offers a much-needed antidote to current debate. His study 
provides an impressive historical survey, including sections on: Israel’s Inheritance from its 
Near Eastern Neighbours, the Old Testament, the Classical World, Judaism Between the 
Testaments, the New Testament, Constructing the Christian Ethos, Christendom, the 
Reformation, and Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II. 
 In the Ancient Near East, where his account begins, marriage was preceded by 
betrothal, which consisted principally of a financial contract. This included a bride price due 
to the father to compensate loss of services, an endowment to support the new wife, and a 
dowry to meet her future needs in case of divorce or widowhood. Divorce was indeed 
common in the Mesopotamian states, as provision for it in marriage contracts suggests, though 
normally the husband’s prerogative: in the Babylonian (Hammurabi) code, a wife who made 
the proposal could be cast into a river and drowned. In Egypt, wives enjoyed considerable 
independence, being able to own property and even sue their husbands. Penalties for adultery, 
however, were as harsh as the Babylonian ones, but applied equally to both parties: not only 
the unfaithful wife could be fed to crocodiles. Disagreement about the relative status of the 
marriage partners persisted in early Judaism, with the two different creation stories the source 
of tensions between rabbis. In the first Priestly account of Genesis, God creates Man and 
Woman together, whereas in the second Jahwist narrative, Woman is created from the rib of 
Man. Even so, Man then clings to Woman in order to recover his missing part. Anachronistic 
modern readings of the Jahwist account are exposed: in particular, the one-flesh relationship 
between man and wife is not specifically sexual, but expresses family kinship. When Laban 
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hails Jacob as ‘my bone and my flesh’, there is no suggestion that they share a sexual 
relationship. Moreover, in early Hebraic law, chastity was obligatory only for the wife, and so 
only in her case did a sexual relation imply a marital one. The dual standards converged in the 
post-Exilic era, however. 
 Classical Greek philosophy treated sex and sexuality in a matter of fact way, though a 
general licentiousness should not be inferred from this: women, for instance, wore a short veil 
for modesty. In early Rome, seduction was punished more severely than rape, on the grounds 
that seduction undermined the marital system, and women were agents in it, whilst assault 
harmed just one person. By the time of the consolidation of the Empire under Caesar 
Augustus, marriage as the transfer of authority (manus) over a woman from father to husband 
had been replaced by free marriage (sine manus), which required simply the couple’s consent. 
Since transfer of property out of the bride’s family no longer formed part of the arrangement, 
divorce by mutual agreement became easier, and women were allowed ‘to own, inherit and 
dispose of property, and engage in business and professional life’. 
 Competing views of the desirability of marriage began to emerge during the 
Intertestamental period. Some rabbinic commentary argues from the Priestly account of the 
simultaneous creation of Man and Woman that only together do they bear the divine image: 
God alone is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, the Priestly tradition in practice excluded women 
from active participation in the public worship that formed the focus of civic life. Jesus’s 
teaching, so clearly opposed to the dual standards for men and women, is radical when viewed 
in this context. The break he effects with Jewish practice should not, however, be overstated. 
In particular, the episode of the woman caught in adultery can be misleading. The penalty of 
death by stoning for adultery was part of Mosaic rather than contemporary Jewish law, and 
like many theoretically harsh sanctions for sexual offences, had rarely if ever been invoked 
when in force. No legal provision for the stoning of the woman existed: the suggestion is 
made to precipitate legal and moral argument. Following the death of Jesus, as Christian 
identity was progressively formed, the difficult question arose of how to reconcile Jewish and 
Gentile marriage practices. The Jerusalem Council responded by turning to the Noachic law 
code established prior to the Torah. Particularly striking is Coleman’s insistence on Paul’s 
positive theology of the body, which draws heavily on I Corinthians, including the suggestion 
that Paul might have been a widower rather than unmarried (I Cor 7.8-9). 
 During the patristic era, a fundamental reappraisal of marriage occurred under the 
influence of Stoicism, Neoplatonism and Christian eschatology. Self-sufficiency was no 
longer considered a property of God alone, but a way of living to which humans might aspire 
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if possessed of a sufficiently strong spiritual motivation and desire for heavenly citizenship. 
Chastity, it was argued, provided a means for the soul to escape from its corrupt earthly body 
to share in resurrection life. This theology is supported by Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose 
and others, who identify the virginity of Jesus and Mary as exemplary, and by Jerome, who 
infers that the apostles were all either celibate, or chaste in their marriages. Against this 
background, Augustine is not the guilt-ridden critic of sensuality frequently portrayed, but the 
theologian of a workable doctrine of marriage for later Western Christendom as it sought to 
regulate human relationships and sexuality. To validate a marriage in the West, consent 
between the couple, parental agreement and witnesses were all that had traditionally been 
needed, with consummation an additional requirement amongst Germanic cultures. 
Nevertheless, the position of chief witness became the prerogative of a local priest, so that by 
the thirteenth century the Church was principal arbiter of who was married and who was not. 
The impetus for this shift seems to have been political rather than religious: the requirement 
that a priest be present, rather than just lay witnesses, was written into the later Tridentine 
marriage decree Tametsi only following fifteen sessions and exhaustive debate. The priestly 
role in marriage thus became similarly decisive to that in the Orthodox tradition, though for 
political reasons and not spiritual ones. Even so, Coleman estimates that in England, as late as 
the Reformation, one third of marriages were still constituted on a customary or common law 
basis with no ecclesiastical involvement. Cranmer’s injunction in the Book of Common Prayer 
that the couple, along with their friends and neighbours, come into the body of the church for 
a solemnization service, rather than remain outside the porch for a blessing, can be seen as 
part of the Reformers’ affirmation of the goodness of marriage. Martin Luther, for instance, 
believed almost everyone to be called to marriage, and only one person in every several 
thousand to chastity. Nevertheless, the movement through the porch accentuated the 
distinction between church and civil marriage, and in so doing made possible the contrary 
inference that the only good marriage was a church one. 
 The final chapter of the study, focusing on England from the Elizabethan Settlement to 
the present day, was left unfinished by Coleman, and therefore leaves various questions open 
for debate. He invites the reader to reflect on different understandings of the relation between 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernism’, and consider the extent to which a ‘traditional’ theology of 
marriage can or should compromise with ‘new morality’. A more critical appraisal of 
‘traditional’ (i.e. modern!) marital ideals might emerge from such a consideration. Church 
marriage did not become mandatory in England until the Hardwicke Act of 1753, which 
(excepting Quakers and Jews) was intended to restrict the ministries of dissenting clergy and 
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clarify inheritance rights. Although many of its social aims were laudable, the new legislation 
fatally undermined the historic notion of marriage, at once theological and civil, as being 
constituted by the mutual consent of the couple in the presence of peers. Coleman refers to the 
view of Christian marriage ‘at least officially’ in a couple of places, but questions need to be 
asked about whether the ‘Christian view’ is embodied in church documents or in the actual 
practice of people who call themselves Christians. The historical account that Coleman 
provides suggests, in any case, the need for far greater criticism of the legalistic, profligate 
display of social and ecclesiastical power that the declining numbers of modern church 
marriages and preparations for them have typically become. Many of the burgeoning numbers 
of relationships not solemnized in church but recognised by family, friends and neighbours, 
certainly have more in common with historic Christian practice. 
 If Western churches are to return to a historic theology of marriage, they will need to 
redefine their role in purely spiritual terms, such as providing the newly-married couple with 
the eucharist, or a blessing for their home. They will also need to recover an understanding of 
marriage as being one amongst a range of meaningful kinship relations, including community 
living and same-sex relationships. Wedded brotherhood, for instance, persisted well beyond 
the Reformation. The suppression of its liturgies and removal of memorials to people of the 
same sex buried together has been well documented by John Boswell, Alan Bray and others, 
and formed a key part of the elimination of all politically significant relationships that were 
not contracts with the state, which provided the logic of modern government. Particular 
relationships might or might not have been sexual: who knows, and who cares? The new 
Church of England marriage rite, in its self-conscious anxiety to echo the preoccupations of 
wider society, replaces the traditional description of a couple forming ‘one flesh’ with a 
reference to ‘the delight and tenderness of sexual union’ that is dreadful even by current 
liturgical standards. In fact, living as ‘one flesh’ suggests a whole range of shared, embodied 
experience - eating, caring, listening, speaking, cleaning - that could be summed up simply as 
living together in mutual recognition. 
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